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Sandner: Sanders: Have Another Round on Me:

Have Another Round on Me: Missouri
Court Awards Workers' Compensation
Benefits to Intoxicated Employees
Smith v. DistrictHA & B 1

I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the Missouri workers' compensation statute is long and
varied. The movement toward a compensation statute began narrowly and
slowly, in response to harsh criticism. The Missouri legislature and courts have
molded and changed it over the years to fit the needs of Missouri's workers.
This Note examines the broadened application of Missouri's workers'
compensation statute under Smith v. DistrictHA & B, in which the Missouri
Court of Appeals awarded workers' compensation benefits to a worker injured
when he drove from a work function while intoxicated. By awarding workers'
compensation benefits to cover illegal conduct such as illegally driving while
intoxicated, Missouri courts are violating legislative intent, violating the
historical purpose of workers' compensation, andpotentially hurting the society
the legislature sought to unburden when it created a compensation scheme for
injured workers.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Terry Dale Smith, a resident of Kirkwood, Missouri, in St. Louis County,
traveled to Kansas City to conduct business for his employer, District H A and
B American Maritime Officers, in his capacity as a union representative.' While
in Kansas City, Smith was involved in a vehicle/train wreck, when his car
skidded off a road and ran into a parked train.3 Smith spent three days in the
hospital and suffered a severe fracture of his right femur, requiring multiple
surgeries from trauma suffered in the accident.4 As a result of the injuries he
suffered in the accident, Smith filed a workers' compensation claim against his
employer's insurance carrier, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company.'
The purpose of Smith's trip to Kansas City was to meet with union
members employed by Penske Logistics and persuade them to maintain their

1. 59 S.W.3d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
2. Id. at 560.

3. Id. at 561.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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relationship with Smith's employer.6 After a full day of meetings, Smith
accompanied some of the managers at Penske to the Argosy Casino to continue
their discussions While discussing matters with the Penske managers, Smith
drank two Bloody Marys. 8 Smith and a Penske payroll clerk remained at the
casino and continued to drink, after the Penske managers left.9 Smith eventually
left the casino, and attempted to drive back to his hotel where he had arranged
to stay the night.'0
As he exited the casino parking lot, Smith mistakenly turned onto an outer
road, which he mistook to be a highway access road." While he drove on the
outer road, Smith used his cellular phone to check his voice mail messages. 2
When the road curved ninety degrees, Smith skidded off the road and down an
embankment, hitting a parked train. 3 The highway patrol accident report
estimated Smith's accident occurred at 10:45 p.m.' 4 The report indicated
"drinking" as a probable contributing circumstance of the accident, and lab
results showed Smith's blood alcohol content after the accident was .15%.15
When a patrolman asked Smith for his name, Smith replied "Dale Earnhardt." 6
Smith was taken by ambulance to the hospital, where his blood alcohol content
was again tested, this time resulting in .169% blood alcohol content. 7 Smith
pleaded guilty to charges of driving under the influence, and his driving
privileges were suspended. 8

6. The Penske union members had filed for decertification of District IIA and B's
union. Smith intended to speak with the union members at Penske regarding the issues
that had precipitated the filing of the decertification. Id. at 560-61. In an effort to
demonstrate his employer's effective representation and to retain his employer's status
as the designated union for the Penske union members, Smith hoped to discuss the union
members' issues and problems with Penske management in orderto resolve anyproblems
and differences between the management and union members. Id.
7. Id. at 561.
8. Id.
9.Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. In Missouri, the legal blood alcohol content limit is 0.08%. Mo. REV.
STAT. § 302.505.1 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
16. Smith, 59 S.W.3d at 561.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Smith filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer. 9 The
administrative law judge ("ALJ') denied the claim, finding that Smith's injuries
"did not arise out of and in the course of his employment."2' The AD ruled that
Smith was incapable of serving his employer's interests at the time of the
accident and, therefore, not entitled to workers' compensation benefits based on
the determination that Smith's trial testimony was not credible,2' the highway
patrol accident report, Smith's blood alcohol level, and his guilty plea to the
charge of driving under the influence. 22 The Missouri Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission ("Commission") reversed the ALJ's ruling and granted
Smith workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he suffered in the
accident.' The Commission determined that the accident was a result of Smith's
unfamiliarity with the area, excessive driving speed, and fatigue, rather than a
result of his intoxication.24 The Commission disagreed with the ALJ's finding
that Smith's testimony was not credible, and was satisfied with the explanation
Smith gave regarding his inconsistent statements. 2

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The ALJ concluded that Smith's trial testimony was not credible because
during Smith's cross-examination, Smith admitted that during his discovery deposition
on June 8, 1999, he testified he was unable to remember anything from the time the
Penske managers left him at the casino until the time of the accident. Id. at 564.
Additionally, the AD found Smith's testimony regarding losing consciousness after the
accident not credible. Id. The medical records made by personnel at the hospital the
night of the accident indicated that Smith said he never lost consciousness after the
accident. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 561.
24. Id. at 563. An employee's intoxication does not bar an employee's recovery
underworkers' compensation unless it was impossible forthe employee to physically and
mentally engage in employment at the time of the accident. Id. (citing Gee v. Bell Pest
Control, 795 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that it is a question of fact
for the Commission whether an employee was able to physically and mentally engage
in employment)).
25. Id. at 563, 564. Smith testified that he was unprepared for the deposition, and
was, therefore, unable to recall the events after the Penske managers left him at the
casino. Id. at 564. He claimed his memory had improved between the time of the
deposition and the trial because he had time to think and remember the specific events
of the evening. Id. The Commission found Smith's explanation to be credible and stated
that it was possible that an individual's memory might improve over time after a
traumatic accident, when a person had time to think back on the events. Id. The
Commission also accepted a physician's testimony explaining that Smith's inconsistent
in-court testimony and the statement recorded in the medical record might have been a
result of the pain of Smith's injuries. Id. Further, pain medication may have contributed
to incorrect statements regarding whether he lost consciousness. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri, Smith's employer argued that Smith was so intoxicated that his mind
was a "total blank," leaving him unable to further his employer's business;
therefore, the accident did not occur within the course and scope of Smith's
employment.26 Smith's employer claimed the Commission erred when it failed
to find as a matter of law that the accident did not arise out of and in the course
of Smith's employment; although his job required him to drive a car, at the time
of the accident he was illegally driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding
the legal limit.27 Lastly, Smith's employer contended that because Smith
deviated from and did not return to the employer's business, the accident was not
within the scope or course of his employment. 28 The court did not find sufficient
merit in any of the employer's arguments on appeal, and found that there was
substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Commission's
findings.2 9
Having found sufficient support in the record for the Commission's ruling,
the court determined there was no error in finding that Smith's accident occurred
within the course and scope of his employment. The court held that the fact that
an employee is intoxicated during an accident does not necessitate a finding that
the employee was acting outside the scope and course of his employment and,
thus, does not automatically bar recovery under workers' compensation.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Development of Workers' CompensationLaw
Near the end of the nineteenth century, state legislatures began considering
the need for workers' compensation statutes in response to the increase in workrelated industrial accidents and the inadequacies of the tort system in protecting
workers injured in such accidents.3" In theory, traditional tort law negligence
claims should have provided compensation to injured workers.3' Under the tort

26. Id. at 561-62. Additionally, Smith's employer appealed the Commission's
rejection ofthe ALJ's findings regarding the credibility of Smith's testimony. Id. at 562.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 563-67. The standard of review for an appellate court in a workers'
compensation case allows the court to review only the findings and award of the
Commission, not of the AL. Id. at 562. The court reviews only questions of law, and
the findings and award need only be supported by competent and substantial evidence
and not be against the weight of the evidence. Id.; see infra note 105.
30. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of
IndustrialAccidents, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 50, 52 (1967).
31. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/7
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met with growing hostility by both courts and legislatures. 4 Moreover, both
courts and employers were anxious to avoid the time and expense that
accompanied industrial accident litigation, not to mention the conflicts the
current law created in the employer and employee relationship."5
The first workers' compensation statutes emerged in response to the
injustice the industrial worker suffered when the courts applied common law
negligence defenses such as the fellow-servant rule and contributory
negligence.56 The major difference between these statutes and the common law
was that the statutes did away with fault and negligence." The statutes created
a form of strict liability, requiring an employer to compensate workers for workrelated injuries regardless of fault.5 8
As state legislatures began to consider workers' compensation statutes, they
found that the costs were no greater under the workers' compensation systems
compared with the existing common law system. 9 Many of the states' workers'
compensation systems had common characteristics.6" For instance, many limited
an employer's liability beyond compensation for work-related injuries. 6' Most
statutes included a simple and inexpensive procedure for settling an injury claim
and determining the compensation amount.62 The compensation amount was
typically determined by a preset schedule which limited the amount an injured
worker could recover.63 The award amounts were viewed and measured as
compensatory, not punitive, and were intended to compensate the worker's loss
of earning power." By limiting awards to the replacement of lost earning power,
the legislators intended to discourage false and prolonged claims, while
providing adequate replacement income and incentive to employers to implement
safety measures.65 The goal of the workers' compensation statutes was to
balance both the workers' and management's interest in accident liability.

54. Friedman & Ladinsky, supranote 30, at 63.
55. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 30, at 63, 65.
56. 82 AM. JUR. 2d. Workers' Compensation § 1, at 27 (1992).
57. Id.; Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 30, at 71.
58. 82 AM. JUR. 2d Workers' Compensation § 1, at 28 (1992).
59. Friedman & Ladinsky, supranote 30, at 70.
60. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 30, at 71; 82 AM. JuR. 2d. Workers'
Compensation § 1, at 30 (1992).
61. 82 AM. JuR 2d., Workers' Compensation § 1, at 28 (1992).
62. Id.
63. Id.; Friedman & Ladinsky, supranote 30, at 71.
64. 82 AM. JuR. 2d. Workers' Compensation § 1, at 28 (1992); Friedman &
Ladinsky, supranote 30, at 71.
65. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 35, § 1.03[4], at 1-9.
66. Friedman & Ladinsky, supranote 30, at 72.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Some have suggested that while the primary purpose of workers'
compensation statutes was to compensate for work-related injuries or diseases,
society has realized much larger benefits than simply a just outcome.67 Mainly,
workers' compensation allocates the burden of supporting injured workers to the
consumers of the products produced by the worker's employer, rather than
leaving society at large with a destitute person to support.6 Additionally, one
observer has asserted that the consumer is the rightful bearer of the expense,
because without the consumers' demand for the product, the injury would never
have occurred.69
B. The History of Workers' Compensation in Missouri
The evolution of Missouri's workers' compensation statute was similar to
workers' compensation statutes in the rest of the country. Prior to the final
passage and approval of the workers' compensation statute in 1931, the only
recovery available to workers injured in industrial accidents was under a
common law tort claim.7" A Missouri employee's tort claim was subject to the
same employer defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and
7
the fellow servant rule, that undermined workers' suits in other jurisdictions. '
As noted, the Missouri legislature eventually stepped in and enacted a
lasting workers' compensation statute 72 when data suggested that between
seventy-five and eighty percent of workers who suffered industrial injuries
received no compensation.73 Initially, the legislature had a difficult time passing
a workers' compensation statute because many viewed it as a form of socialism.74
Though the first movement for workers' compensation legislation in Missouri
began in 1909, it was not until 1931 that a workers' compensation statute7S was
finally passed, approved in a referendum, and declared constitutional.76
As with other laws across the country, the purpose of the Missouri statute
was to relieve society of the burden of supporting injured workers and their

67.

LARSON & LARSON, supra note 35,

§ 1.03, at 1-5, 1-6.

68. LARSON & LARSON, supranote 35, § 1.03, at 1-5, 1-6.
69. LARSON & LARSON, supranote 35, § 1.03, at 1-5, 1-6.
70. LARSON & LARSON, supranote 35, § 1.03, at 1-5, 1-6.
71. LARSON & LARSON, supranote 35, § 1.03, at 1-5, 1-6.
72. The first workmen's compensation law was R.S. 1929, § 3299. TIMOTHY J.
HEiNSZ, MIssouRi WORKERS' COMPENSATION: LAW & PRACTICE § 1-1 (1984).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. The title of the Missouri statute was "The Workmen's Compensation
Law," until it was amended in 1980 and retitled "The Workers' Compensation Law."
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.010 (2000).
76. HEINSZ, supranote 72, at § 1-1.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/7
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families, and place the cost and expense of production-related injuries on the
consumer." The statute provided an employee compensation for work-related
injuries without requiring a determination of fault or employer negligence.78 In
return for speedy and assured compensation, when an employee's injuries are
covered by workers' compensation, the workers' compensation award is the only

remedy available to the employee against the employer.79
C. Missouri's Workers' Compensation Statute
Missouri's current statute makes workers' compensation mandatory for
almost all employers and employees," leaving coverage optional only for a
narrowly defined class of employers.8
The Missouri statute provides
compensation for the "clearly work related"82 injury or death of an employee,83
if the injury arose "out of and in the course of employment."' The statute is to
be liberally construed in favor of employees so as to give effect to the statute's
purposes.8"

77. HEINSZ, supranote 72, § 1-2; see Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor Serv., 551 S.W.2d
616 (Mo. 1977); Alexander v. Pin Oaks Nursing Home, 625 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
78. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120.1 (2000).

79. Id. § 287.120.2. The statute also excludes additional remedies to any other
party in a suit on behalf of an employee's covered injuries. Id. The statute does not
prevent a party from filing suit against a third-party tortfeasor or from filing a claim for
any accident not covered by workers' compensation. Id. § 287.150.
80. Id. § 287.060. Before 1974, coverage under Missouri's workers' compensation
laws was essentially voluntary. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.060, Historical & Statutory
Notes (West 1993). While there was a presumption of employer acceptance of workers'
compensation, an employer could file a notice of rejection of coverage. Id.
81. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.090 (2000). Exempt employers include employers such
as small businesses, volunteers of tax-exempt organizations, and private households. Id.
82. The employee's work must have been a substantial factor in causing the injury
to be "clearly work related." Id. § 287.020.2.
83. Id. § 287.020.3, .4.
84. Id. § 287.020.3. Only where it is (1) reasonably apparent that the employee's
employment was a substantial factor in the resulting injury, (2) the injury logically
follows as a result of work, (3) the employment was a proximate cause of injury, and (4)
the injury did not come from an unrelated employment risk, that employee was exposed
to equally outside work, does an injury "arise out of and in the course of employment."
Id. § 287.020.3(2). Forty-three states have adopted the same "arising out of and in the
course of employment" language. LARSON & LARSON, supranote 35, § 3.01, at 3-3.
85. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.800 requires that the workers'
compensation provisions be construed liberally in regard of public welfare and that the
application of the provisions not be affected by technical errors. Mo. REV. STAT. §

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Whether an injury arises "out of' and "in the course" of employment, and,
thus, is covered by the statute, is a two-part test, and is determined based on the
facts of each individual case. 6 The first part of the test, to arise out of
employment, indicates a causal connection between the risk and the
employment, 7 which requires that the exposure to the injurious hazard be on
account of the employment."8 The employee's work must have been a substantial
factor in causing the injury to be "clearly work related."89 A causal connection
may be shown if conditions of the employment contributed to the injury and the
injurious acts were incidental to employment performed for the benefit of the
employer. 90
Whether an injury satisfies the second part of the test and arose in the course
of employment is determined by the connection between the employment and the
injury in regard to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. 9' The injury
must have occurred during a time of employment, at a location where the
employee was reasonably located for work purposes, and while the employee
was engaged in activities incidental to employment. 92 Generally, when an
employee abandons duties connected with her employment, and engages in
personal activity, the employer is not liable for any injuries that occur during this
time because the injuries do not arise out of and in the course of employment. 93

287.800 (2000); see Williams v. City ofAva, 982 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); State
ex rel. Doe Run Co. v. Brown, 918 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); see also cases at
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.800 (West 1993 & 2002 Supp.).
86. JAMES S. RANKIN, JR., MissouRi WORKERS' COMPENSATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 6-1 (2d ed. 1997); LARSON & LARSON, supra note 35, § 3.02, at 3-4; see
Abel v. Mike Russell's Standard Serv., 924 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Mo. 1996).
87. LARSON & LARSON, supranote 35, § 3.01, at 3-1 through 3-4; RANKIN, supra
note 86, §§ 6-1, 6-4; see Thompson v. Otis Elevator Co., 324 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959) (For an injury to arise "out of the employment," there must be a causal
connection between the resulting injury and the conditions under which the work was
performed.); Conyers v. Krey Packing Co., 194 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946).
88. RANKIN, supra note 86, § 6-4; see Hacker v. City of Potosi 351 S.W.2d 760,
762-63 (Mo. 1961) (An injury resulting "out of' employment refers to the origin or cause
of the injury.).
89. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.020.2 (2000).
90. RANKIN, supra note 86, § 6-4; see Winsor v. Lee Johnson Const. Co., 950
S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Quilty v. Frank's Food Mart, 890 S.W.2d 360,
363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
91. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 35, § 3.01 at 3-1 through 3-4; RANKIN, supra
note 86, §§ 6-1, 6-5; see Hacker, 340 S.W.2d 166.
92. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.020.3 (2000); see RANKIN, supranote 86, § 6-5; see also
Thompson v. Otis Elevator Co., 324 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
93. RANKIN, supra note 86, at § 6-5; see Jemison v. Superior Auto Mall, 932
S.W.2d 431,433 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/7
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In applying the language of the statute, Missouri courts tend to evaluate
whether the injury was in the course of employment based on whose interests,
the employer's or the employee's, were being served at the time.94 Any injuries
suffered by the employee while engaged in personal activities do not arise out of
and in the course of employment, and, therefore, are not covered by workers'
compensation.9" An employee's deviation must be closely scrutinized to
determine the precise moment when the deviation and non-work related activities
began and when activities within the course ofemployment resumed.96 Once the
employee ceases the personal deviation and returns to the employer's business,
the deviation is considered over, and the employee is once again covered for any
injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
Additionally, injuries suffered while the employee was coming from or
going to work generally do not qualify for workers' compensation because
commutes are not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment.93
The Missouri Supreme Court created an exception, however, for workers
traveling on employer business away from work premises. 9 A traveling
employee on a special errand for an employer is within the course ofemployment
unless he deviates and leaves the course of employment by engaging in personal
activities and errands. 00
If an employee is intoxicated while within the scope of employment and an
injury occurs, an employer may be able to use the employee's intoxication as an
affirmative defense to deny compensation.'0 ' Missouri courts have established
a standard to determine whether an employee is covered: the employee is still
covered unless there is evidence to show that it was impossible for the employee
to physically and mentally engage in her employment due to intoxication. 2 To

94. RANKIN, supranote 86, § 6-8; see Cook v. St. Mary's Hosp., 939 S.W.2d 934
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (nurse awarded compensation for injuries suffered when she was
attacked by a wild bird while in client's home serving employer's interest). But cf.
Jemison, 932 S.W.2d 431 (compensation denied because accident occurred during lunch
hour).
95. Miller v. Sleight & Hellmuth Ink Co., 436 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1969).
96. B. MICHAEL KORTE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWAND PRACTICE, MISSOURI
PRACTICE SERIES, § 2.39 (2000).
97. RANKIN, supra note 86, § 6-8; see Miller,436 S.W.2d at 625.
98. Cox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Mo. 1996).
99. Miller, 436 S.W.2d at 628.
100. Id.; see KORTE, supra note 96, § 2.39.
101. HEINSZ, supranote 72, § 7-6. The affirmative defense of intoxication bars an
employee's recovery of compensation, if the appropriate threshold is met. Id.
102. Gee v. Bell Pest Control, 795 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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qualify as physically or mentally unable to engage in employment, the
employee's mind must have been a "total blank" as a result of intoxication. 3
The judicial development and application of Missouri's workers'
compensation statute has been long and varied. It is under the guidance of this
precedence that the Western District Court of Appeals decided Smith v. District
IIA &B.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Smith v. District11A & B, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District considered District II A and B's appeal from the Commission's reversal
of the ALJ and award of compensation benefits to Smith." 4 On the first point of
appeal, the Western District affinmed the Commission's ruling and held that
Smith was not so intoxicated that he could not further his employer's business
because his mind was not a "total blank."' 5 Therefore, the court found that the
injuries resulting from the accident did arise out of and in the course of Smith's
employment. 106

103. Id. at 536-37.
104. Smith v. Dist. II A & B, 59 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). The ALJ
initially ruled against Smith, finding that his injuries were not compensable because they
did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Id. The Commission, on
review, reversed the ALI and awarded Smith workers' compensation benefits. Id.
105. Id. The standard for review in a workers' compensation case is set forth in
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.495.1. The section provides:
[I]n the absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the commission within
its powers shall be conclusive and binding. The court, on appeal, shall review
only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set
aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other:
(1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the award was procured by fraud;
(3) That the facts found by the commission do not support the
award;
(4) That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record
to warrant the making of the award.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.495.1 (2000 & Supp. 2001). The reviewing court, in a two-step
process, considers the findings and award of the Commission, not the ALL Davis v.
Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). The appellate court first
reviews the whole record for competent and substantial evidence, in a manner most
favorable to the award. Id. Then, the court reviews the entire record to determine
whether the award is against the weight of evidence, including consideration of
unfavorable evidence. Id.
106. Smith, 59 S.W.3d at 563.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/7
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The court relied on Gee v. Bell Pest Control,07 which stated that whether
an employee was not able to engage in the furtherance of his employer's business
as a result of intoxication is a question of fact for the Commission. 8 The court
further stated that under Gee, an employee's high blood alcohol content is not a
sufficient ground to deny a workers' compensation claim.0 9 In order to deny
benefits, the court stated, there must be evidence that, at the time of the injury,
the employee was so intoxicated his mind was a "total blank" and he was
physically and mentally incapable of engaging in his employment."10 The court
of appeals found sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission's
finding that Smith's mind was not a "total blank" as the result of intoxication at
the time of his accident.' It was, therefore, not impossible for Smith to engage
in his employment."' The court noted that Smith's fatigue, unfamiliarity with
the road, and excessive speed likely contributed to the accident at least as much
as the alcohol in his system."'
Smith's employer's second point of appeal claimed that Smith was not in
the course and scope of his employment because he was required to drive a car
in his employment, but that, at the time, he was driving illegally." 4 In response,
the court noted that limitations on recovery of workers' compensation benefits
are for the legislature, not the court, to decide."I As a result, the court held that,
until the legislature further limits the recovery of workers' compensation
benefits, the court was bound by the standard set in Gee." 6 This standard
required that an employee be intoxicated to the extent that it was physically and
mentally impossible for the employee to engage in his employment before
workers' compensation could be denied, and, thus, Smith was not sufficiently
7
intoxicated to deny compensation.'
With regard to the employer's last point on appeal, the court concluded that,
because the injuries were sustained while traveling for the employer's purposes,

107. 795 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
108. Smith, 59 S.W.3d at 563 (relying on Gee, 795 S.W.2d at 537).
109. Id.
110. Gee, 795 S.W.2d at 536-37.
111. Smith, 59 S.W.3d at 563, 564-65.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 563.
114. Id. at 565.
115. Id. The court acknowledged that the legislature has enacted legislation that
bars recovery when an employee violates an employer's posted alcohol policy and the
violation is a proximate cause of the injury. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120.6 (2000).
116. Smith, 59 S.W.3d at 565 (citing Gee v. Bell Pest Control, 795 S.W.2d 532,
537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)).
117. Id.
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they were compensable." 8 The court noted that an employee is within the course
of employment except when a personal errand or personal social motive causes
a departure from the course of employment." 9 Once the employee's personal
departure has ended and he returns to the employer's business, any injuries then
sustained arise out of and in the course of employment. 2 ' In the instant case, the
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to establish that,
when Smith met and conducted business with the Penske managers at the casino,
he was serving his employer's business purpose.' Smith deviated from the
course of his employment when he remained at the casino drinking, but the
deviation ended when he left the casino to return to his hotel." Therefore, the
court concluded that at the time of the accident, Smith had returned to his
employer's business and the accident occurred within the scope and course of his
employment."
Thus, Smith was not barred from receiving workers'
compensation benefits.
V. COMMENT

The creation of workers' compensation was in response to the perceived
unjust treatment of injured workers, and it was originally enacted to protect
employees from employer negligence and the bars to recovery established by the
common law.' 24 After almost seventy-five years of applying the workers'
compensation act to relieve society of the burden of supporting injured workers,
the Missouri Court of Appeals, in Smith v. District11 A & B, has expanded
workers' compensation to a point that potentially defeats that purpose by actually
increasing the cost to Missouri's economy and citizens. 2 ' The decision also
seems incongruous with Missouri's laws against drunk driving. 26 Perhaps in
light of the court's decision in Smith, and the continued expansion of workers'
compensation benefits,' 27 there will eventually be a need for statutes to protect
employers from employees' negligence.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.at 566.
122. Id.
123. Id.

124. See supratext accompanying notes 30-79.
125. See supratext accompanying notes 72-79.
126. See supra note 15; infra notes 130-3 1.

127. See supratext accompanying notes 85, 115-16.
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A. Incongruity with Missouri'sDrunk Driving Statute
Missouri courts have remained consistent in their efforts to protect
employees and give effect to legislative purpose by construing the Missouri
workers' compensation statute as liberally as possible in favor of employees,
when deciding cases involving intoxicated employees.'28 As noted previously,
the Missouri courts have held that, to bar an employee from recovery, an
employee must be intoxicated to the extent that his mind is a "total blank," and
it is impossible for the employee to engage in his employment. 129 Perhaps the
"total blank" standard has been appropriate in previous cases, but the court
missed an important opportunity to reemphasize the intent of workers'
compensation, and to relieve society of a costly burden when it upheld
compensation in Smith v. District -A & B.
The Missouri legislature has made it clear that driving while intoxicated is
an unacceptable risk on society by establishing a rather stringent numerical blood
alcohol limit. 30 The legislature has established that a driver arrested with a blood
alcohol content of .08% or more shall have his license suspended or revoked.''
Additionally, the Missouri legislature has also enacted legislation that bars
recovery by an employee when he violates a known and posted alcohol policy
of the employer, and the violation is a proximate cause of an injury. 3 ' The
Missouri courts have not expanded the meaning of a known and posted alcohol
policy to include state laws.'33 Why an employer should be required to post state
laws to ensure that an employee is aware of the state law against driving with a
blood alcohol content of over .08% does not appear to be discussed in any
Missouri cases.

128. See Champion v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. 6 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999); Page v. Green, 686 S.W.2d 528, 530-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
129. Bridges v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc., 940 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Gee v. Bell Pest Control, 795 S.W.2d 532, 536-37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Swillum v.
Empire Gas Transp., Inc., 698 S.W.2d 921, 924-25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
130. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.505.1 (Supp. 2001).
131. Id. The legislature's stringent attitude against operating a vehicle while
intoxicated is obvious by the repeated amendments to the statute reducing the legally
permissible alcohol concentration. An amendment in 1991 reduced the previous legal
limit from "thirteen-hundredths" to "ten-hundredths." Act of June 20, 1991, 1991 Mo.
LAWS 702, 711; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.505 (West 2000). The most recent
amendment, in 2001, again reduced the legal limit to the current limit of "eighthundredths." Act of June 12,2001,2001 Mo. LAWS 416,423; see also Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 302.505 (West Supp. 2001).
132. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120.6 (2000).
133. Higgins v. D.W.F. Wholesale Florists, 14 S.W.3d 286, 290 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000).
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By allowing Smith to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries
suffered while he was operating his vehicle in violation of state law, the court
essentially defeated the legislature's efforts to curb drunk driving and to relieve
society of the risks and expense caused by drunk drivers. While a "total blank"
standard may be appropriate in other circumstances to avoid overly harsh results
and to fulfill the liberal construction mandate,' 34 it is not appropriate in13a5
circumstance when the standard used by the courts violates a criminal statute.
The courts should recognize the legislature's intent to make driving under the
influence an illegal act, and should not allow an employee to engage in illegal
conduct and simultaneously recover for injuries suffered as a result. When Smith
plead guilty to the offense of driving under the influence, he acknowledged his
illegal conduct and, at this point, the employer's liability should have been
extinguished.
B. An InsuranceLaw Argument
Workers' compensation is based upon principles of insurance. 136 As such,
it would be appropriate to consider accepted practices in insurance law to
determine the appropriate treatment of illegal conduct in determining whether or
not to award benefits. In cases where an insured intentionally causes damage to
his or her personal property, coverage is appropriately denied.'37 Additionally,
courts have consistently held that it violates public policy to provide insurance
benefits to cover punitive damages for intentional conduct. 31 To allow an actor
who intentionally drives while intoxicated, and is ultimately injured in an
not deter bad actions, and, in
accident, to benefit from insurance coverage will
39
fact, would create incentives for such actions.
In the same way that insurance law wants to discourage intentional
misconduct by creating an exclusion from coverage, so should workers'
compensation create coverage exclusions. One of the aims of workers'
compensation was to encourage employers to implement safety measures.' 4 By
the same token, workers' compensation could encourage legal, responsible
employee conduct by not rewarding and compensating injuries suffered while an
134. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.800 (2000); seesupranote 85 and accompanying text..
135. In Smith, the injured employee plead guilty to the charge of driving under the
influence and received a suspended license. Smith v. Dist. II A & B, 59 S.W.3d 558, 561
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
136. HEINSz, supranote 72, § 1-2.
137. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW, § 63A, at 460 (3d
ed. 2002).
138. Id. § 65[e], at 574.
139. Id. § 63A, at 461.
140. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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employee is engaged in illegal conduct. Additionally, by creating an exception
to coverage in these cases, courts would be reinforcing the legislature's efforts
to discourage illegal and dangerous conduct as when it establishes driving with
a blood alcohol content of more than .08% as a criminal violation.
Workers' compensation can take another lesson from insurance law
regarding the coverage ofpunitive damages vicariously imposed on an employer
as a result of an employee's actions. Insurance law does not cover the punitive
damages assessed to an individual bad actor, but any liability imposed on an
employer as a result of an employee's bad actions through doctrines of vicarious
liability 4' or respondeat superior may be shifted to the employer's insurance. 42
Therefore, it is conceivable that the employer's insurance will be called on to
cover the liability resulting from the bad actions of an employee, protecting the
bad actor from being held responsible herself for the actions.
By learning from insurance law's example, Missouri courts could easily take
a preemptive strike at avoiding a potential injustice that might arise under the
current workers' compensation application. Consider a twist on the current case:
Smith could have easily run into another vehicle or person, injuring another
party, instead of "skidding off the road down an embankment and hit[ting] a
parked train."' 43 In this situation, Smith's employer would likely have been
liable for the action of its agent, Smith, given that the court found he was in the
course of his employment at the time of the accident. At this point, the employer
would be liable for both the damages to the third party and the workers'
compensation claim filed by Smith for his injuries. The possibility that an
employer may face liability for both sets of damages, which are only the result
ofan employee's illegal conduct, would be manifestly unjust and would place an
undue burden on the employer.
Unless workers are held personally accountable for their actions, rather than
being able to rely on workers' compensation, they will feel free to act in an
irresponsible manner and take unnecessary risks as did Smith in this case. In
light of the current decision, it is time that the courts and the legislature react to
the conflicting interest between protecting employees from the negligence of
employers and rewarding them for their own illegal and irresponsible actions.
It is time to harmonize the need to protect the employee's interest with the
interests of the employer and society at large. The courts should recognize an
exception to workers' compensation coverage when an employee engages in
illegal conduct of his own volition.

141. An employer will be insured against punitive damages so long as its own
behavior was no worse than negligent, such as in failing to supervise the employee.
JERRY, supranote 137, § 65[e], at 578.
142. JERRY, supra note 137, § 65[e], at 578-79.
143. Smith v. Dist. II A & B, 59 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Under the current over-broad application of workers' compensation in
Smith, Professor Larson's prediction regarding the obvious dangers of employer
liability for injuries getting out of hand seems to have come true in Missouri.'"
By holding employers liable for injuries suffered from the illegal conduct of
employees, the employers of Missouri face a potentially unfathomable rise in
workers' compensationjudgments. The extension of workers' compensation to
this extreme limit could drive current employers to relocate to different
jurisdictions where the workers' compensation laws are more favorable to
employers and discourage new business development in Missouri. At the very
least, employers will incur increased monitoring costs as they now must more
closely scrutinize the activities of their employees because, under the current
application, an employee is protected from the consequences of his own
irresponsible behavior, while an employer may be liable for the financial costs
of these consequences.
Missouri has a chance to return to the purpose under which it originally
enacted its workers' compensation statute. Missouri acted to correct the
injustices of leaving workers without rights, remedies, or income, and ultimately
turning workers out on the streets. Let's not now inflict the same injustices on
employers and leave them out in the cold.
KIMBERLY D. SANDNER

144. See LARSON & LARSON, supranote 35, § 22.04[1][d], at 22-17.
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